China. Supply chain mapped to 51 inputs across 8 countries.
Yes. China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) is named on the DOD Section 1260H list and the BIS Entity List -- a federal restricted-party designation that makes it a foreign entity of concern for IRA clean-energy tax credit purposes. Is China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) a Foreign Entity of Concern?
Upstream sourcing exposure
1 federally designated - 36 in covered nations - 10 elevated, of 51 nodes.
Where inputs are mined and refined. Not a FEOC determination for the company -- see the federal list screening above.
Refining chokepoint
7 of 8 processing/refining steps in covered nations
Where each input is mined or refined. Not a FEOC determination for the company.
Node Types
Sourcing risk
Relationships
51 nodes, grouped by supply-chain tier. Sourcing risk describes where an input is mined or refined; it is not a FEOC determination for China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN).
| Input | Origin | Sourcing risk | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN)Shenzhen, Guangdong, China | China | Federally designated | Named on BIS ENTITY LISTas “China General Nuclear Power Group” (84 FR 40241). State-owned Chinese nuclear operator; builds HPR1000/Hualong One Gen-III PWR. ~90% domestic supply chain, ~6,000 Chinese suppliers. Chinese state entity = FEOC flagged. |
| Input | Origin | Sourcing risk | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| HPR1000 / Hualong One Reactor UnitFangchenggang / Fuqing, China | China | Covered nation | CGN's Gen-III pressurized water reactor; co-developed with CNNC. Nuclear + conventional island assembled domestically. |
| Nuclear Island (NSSS)China | China | Covered nation | Nuclear steam supply system: RPV, steam generators, RCPs, pressurizer, internals, control rods. |
| Conventional Island (Turbine Island)China | China | Covered nation | Turbine-generator, condenser, feedwater. Half-speed Arabelle-derived turbine tech. |
| Nuclear Fuel AssemblyYibin, Sichuan / Baotou, China | China | Covered nation | CNNC/CGN fuel fabrication. Fuel rods = enriched UO2 pellets in zirconium-alloy cladding. |
| Instrumentation & Control (I&C)China | China | Covered nation | Reactor protection & control systems; largely domestic (FirmSys-class DCS). |
| Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)China First Heavy Industries, Qiqihar | China | Covered nation | Heavy forging; CFHI and China Erzhong are China's very-heavy forging houses for RPVs. |
| Steam GeneratorsDongfang (Guangzhou) Heavy Machinery (DEC) | China | Covered nation | DEC Guangzhou delivered China's first Gen-III nuclear steam generator (60-yr life) to Hualong One. |
| Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP)Harbin Electric / CNNC | China | Covered nation | Canned-motor primary coolant pumps; HEC formed team with CNNC on RCP supply. |
| PressurizerChina | China | Covered nation | Maintains primary loop pressure; low-alloy steel forging with Inconel cladding. |
| Reactor InternalsChina | China | Covered nation | Core support structures, baffle/former; austenitic stainless steel. |
| Control Rod AssembliesChina | China | Covered nation | Neutron absorbers: Ag-In-Cd alloy (80/15/5) and/or B4C, hafnium in stainless cladding. |
| Steam Turbine-GeneratorDongfang Electric Machinery Co | China | Covered nation | Half-speed turbine (Arabelle tech via Alstom cooperation); 240t generator rotor forged by DEC. |
| CondenserChina | China | Covered nation | Titanium/stainless tubed surface condenser on the conventional island. |
| Zirconium-Alloy Fuel CladdingChina | China | Covered nation | Zircaloy / Zr-Nb tubing (Zr + Sn/Fe/Cr/Nb). Made from nuclear-grade zirconium sponge. |
| Enriched UO2 Fuel PelletsYibin, Sichuan | China | Covered nation | Sintered uranium dioxide pellets, ~3-5% U-235; CNNC Yibin ~400 tU/yr. |
| Input | Origin | Sourcing risk | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zirconium/Hafnium Separation & Sponge RefiningCNNC, China | China | Covered nation | Zr-Hf separation + Kroll/pyrometallurgical reduction to nuclear-grade sponge. FEOC midstream chokepoint. |
| Uranium Enrichment (Centrifuge)Lanzhou Plant 504 / Hanzhong Plant 405 | China | Covered nation | Gas centrifuge enrichment of UF6 to LEU. Core FEOC fuel-cycle chokepoint held by China. |
| Uranium Conversion (U3O8 -> UF6)Lanzhou / Hengyang conversion plants | China | Covered nation | Converts yellowcake to UF6 feed. ~10,000 tU/yr Chinese conversion capacity. Midstream chokepoint. |
| Indium RefiningChina | China | Covered nation | China refines the majority of world indium (zinc smelting by-product). Refining chokepoint. |
| Nickel Refining (Indonesia, China-invested)Morowali / Weda Bay industrial parks | Indonesia | Elevated sourcing risk | Chinese-operated HPAL & matte refining converts ore to Class-1 Ni / nickel sulfate. Flagged. |
| Titanium Sponge Refining (Kroll)China | China | Covered nation | China dominates titanium sponge production via Kroll process. Refining chokepoint. |
| Rare Earth Separation & RefiningChina (Inner Mongolia / Jiangxi) | China | Covered nation | China refines ~85-90% of separated rare earths (Nd/Pr/Dy). Dominant FEOC chokepoint. |
| Copper Smelting & RefiningChina | China | Covered nation | China is the world's largest copper smelter/refiner. Refining chokepoint. |
| Input | Origin | Sourcing risk | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nuclear-Grade Zirconium SpongeCNNC subsidiary (China Atomic Energy Industry) | China | Covered nation | Hf-separated nuclear-grade Zr sponge; CNNC is the only fully-integrated Chinese producer, now exporting. China = refining chokepoint. |
| Zircon Sand (ZrSiO4)Heavy mineral sands | Australia | No known risk factor | Primary Zr ore; co-product of titanium mineral sands. Australia + South Africa = >50% of global zircon. |
| Hafnium MetalChina | China | Covered nation | Separated from zirconium during Zr sponge refining; used in control rods. China-refined co-product = flagged. |
| Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU, UF6)Lanzhou (504) / Hanzhong (405) | China | Covered nation | 3-5% U-235; enriched at Chinese centrifuge plants. China enrichment ~11M SWU/yr. Domestic enrichment = flagged. |
| Uranium Ore Concentrate (Yellowcake, U3O8)Swakop Uranium / CNUC | Namibia | Elevated sourcing risk | Milled U3O8 from CGN/CNNC-controlled foreign mines; feeds Chinese conversion. Allied-mined but China-controlled + China-processed. |
| Silver-Indium-Cadmium AlloyChina | China | Covered nation | ~80% Ag / 15% In / 5% Cd absorber. China dominates indium & cadmium refining. Flagged on refining. |
| Boron Carbide (B4C)China | China | Covered nation | Neutron absorber for control rods/shutdown. China is a major boron/B4C producer. Flagged. |
| Inconel 690 / Ni-Cr SuperalloyChina | China | Covered nation | Steam generator tubing (Inconel 690 TT) + RCP/pressurizer parts. Ni-Cr-Fe superalloy. China-melted = flagged. |
| Refined Nickel / Nickel SulfateIndonesia (China-invested HPAL/smelters) | Indonesia | Elevated sourcing risk | Nickel refined largely in Chinese-invested Indonesian plants (~$30B Chinese investment). Flagged on refining. |
| Ferrochrome / ChromiumChina | China | Covered nation | Chromium source in Inconel/stainless (15-30% Cr). China leads ferrochrome smelting. Flagged. |
| Low-Alloy Nuclear Forging Steel (SA-508)China First Heavy Industries, Qiqihar | China | Covered nation | Mn-Mo-Ni low-alloy steel for RPV/pressurizer heavy forgings. Melted & forged in China. Flagged. |
| Austenitic Stainless Steel (304/316)China | China | Covered nation | Reactor internals & cladding overlay. Cr-Ni stainless melted in China. Flagged. |
| Iron OrePilbara, Western Australia | Australia | No known risk factor | Iron units for steel forgings; largely Australian ore feeding Chinese steelmaking. |
| Titanium (Condenser Tubing)China | China | Covered nation | Ti tubing for seawater-cooled condensers. Titanium sponge heavily China-refined. Flagged on refining. |
| NdFeB Permanent MagnetsChina | China | Covered nation | Rare-earth magnets in generator excitation/actuators & pump motors. China dominates NdFeB. Flagged. |
| Copper (Generator Windings)China | China | Covered nation | Generator stator/rotor windings & cabling. China leads copper refining/smelting. Flagged on refining. |
| Input | Origin | Sourcing risk | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zircon / Heavy Mineral Sands Mine (Australia)Western Australia / Murray Basin | Australia | No known risk factor | Placer heavy-mineral-sand deposits; zircon mined with ilmenite/rutile. |
| Zircon / Mineral Sands Mine (South Africa)Richards Bay / KwaZulu-Natal coast | South Africa | No known risk factor | Coastal heavy-mineral-sand mining; major global zircon source alongside Australia. |
| Husab Uranium MineSwakop Uranium, Erongo, Namibia | Namibia | Elevated sourcing risk | 90% owned by Taurus Minerals (CGN + China-Africa Development Fund); 10% Epangelo. CGN-controlled = flagged. |
| Rössing Uranium MineCNUC (CNNC), Erongo, Namibia | Namibia | Elevated sourcing risk | Controlled by China National Uranium Corp (CNNC) after 2019 Rio Tinto stake buy. China-controlled = flagged. |
| Irkol & Semizbai Uranium MinesSino-Kazakhstan Uranium Resources (CGN JV) | Kazakhstan | Elevated sourcing risk | CGN JV ISR uranium mines in Kazakhstan (world's largest U producer). China JV control = flagged. |
| Borate Ore MineTurkey (Eti Maden) / USA | Turkey | Elevated sourcing risk | Boron from borate ores (Turkey dominant, plus US). Ore allied but downstream B4C often China-processed. |
| Nickel Laterite MineSulawesi / Halmahera, Indonesia | Indonesia | Elevated sourcing risk | Laterite ore feeding Indonesian refineries. Ore Indonesian but midstream China-controlled. |
| Chromite MineBushveld Complex, South Africa | South Africa | Elevated sourcing risk | Chromite ore (world's largest reserves). Ore allied; much smelting/ferrochrome shifted to China. |
| Iron Ore MinePilbara, Western Australia | Australia | No known risk factor | Australian iron ore (Rio/BHP/FMG). Allied-mined; smelting in China. |
| Rare Earth Ore MineBayan Obo, Inner Mongolia | China | Covered nation | Bayan Obo REE ore for Nd/Pr; mined and refined in China. Flagged. |
| Copper MineAtacama, Chile | Chile | Elevated sourcing risk | Copper concentrate (Chile largest producer). Ore allied; refining largely in China. |
Research-based supply-chain map compiled from public sources - not an audited bill of materials. Tiers reflect the standard industry structure for this product. Sourcing risk on a node describes where that input is typically mined or refined; it is not a FEOC determination for China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN), and it is not a screening result for the node itself unless a federal listing is cited against it. Verify against primary documentation before making a compliance determination.
Primary sources (2) - government, filings, standards bodies
Secondary sources (19) - trade press, analysts, reference works