Russia. Supply chain mapped to 45 inputs across 9 countries.
Yes. Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation is covered by a federal restricted-party designation on the BIS Entity List and the OFAC SDN List, through the related entity named in the citation below. Is Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation a Foreign Entity of Concern?
Upstream sourcing exposure
34 in covered nations - 9 elevated, of 45 nodes.
Where inputs are mined and refined. Not a FEOC determination for the company -- see the federal list screening above.
Refining chokepoint
8 of 8 processing/refining steps in covered nations
Where each input is mined or refined. Not a FEOC determination for the company.
Node Types
Sourcing risk
Relationships
45 nodes, grouped by supply-chain tier. Sourcing risk describes where an input is mined or refined; it is not a FEOC determination for Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation.
| Input | Origin | Sourcing risk | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rosatom State Nuclear Energy CorporationMoscow HQ; VVER-1200/VVER-TOI reactor program | Russia | Covered nation | Russian state nuclear corp; FEOC by nationality (covered nation). Vertically integrated across fuel cycle, reactor manufacture and construction. |
| Input | Origin | Sourcing risk | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nuclear Fuel Assemblies (VVER hexagonal)TVEL fuel division; MSZ Elektrostal, NCCP Novosibirsk | Russia | Covered nation | TVEL makes ~17% of world nuclear fuel. Hexagonal VVER assemblies; enriched UO2 pellets in zirconium cladding. |
| Reactor Pressure VesselAtommash (AEM-Technology), Volgodonsk | Russia | Covered nation | Single-piece forged Mn-Ni-Mo low-alloy steel vessel; 15,100-tonne press. Newer VVER-TOI uses nickel-free steel for 120-yr life. |
| Steam GeneratorsAtomenergomash / Atommash, Volgodonsk | Russia | Covered nation | Atomenergomash is sole Russian maker of NPP steam generators and main circulation pumps. |
| Gas Centrifuge Enrichment CascadeTVEL separation plants (UEIP Novouralsk, ECP Zelenogorsk, AECC Angarsk, SCC Seversk) | Russia | Covered nation | 10th-gen HZ-10 centrifuges. Rosatom holds ~36% of global enrichment. Rotors of maraging steel / carbon-fibre composite. |
| Turbine-Generator IslandPower Machines (Silmash) LMZ, St Petersburg | Russia | Covered nation | 1200 MWe turbogenerators for Leningrad II / Novovoronezh II / Kursk II. Titanium-tubed condensers. |
| Control Rod / Absorber AssembliesTVEL | Russia | Covered nation | Neutron-absorbing rods: B4C, dysprosium titanate, Ag-In-Cd, hafnium; Gd2O3 burnable poison in pellets. |
| Main Circulation PumpsAtomenergomash (CKBM), St Petersburg | Russia | Covered nation | Primary-loop coolant pumps for VVER; Atomenergomash is sole Russian supplier. |
| Enriched UO2 Fuel PelletsMSZ Elektrostal / NCCP | Russia | Covered nation | Sintered uranium dioxide pellets, ~5% U-235 enrichment; some erbium-doped (REMIX/ATF). |
| Zirconium Alloy Cladding TubesChepetsky Mechanical Plant (ChMZ), Glazov | Russia | Covered nation | E110/E635 Zr-Nb alloy fuel-rod cladding; ATF variant has Cr coating. ChMZ is TVEL zirconium arm. |
| Input | Origin | Sourcing risk | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Uranium Milling / Refining (yellowcake)Rosatom/ARMZ + JV mills (Kazakhstan) | Russia | Covered nation | Ore leached and refined to U3O8. Russian/Rosatom-controlled processing = flagged chokepoint even when mine is allied-neutral. |
| Zirconium Refining (chlorination + Hf separation)ChMZ Glazov (Russia); global capacity also in China (CNNC Jinghuan) | Russia | Covered nation | Ore cracking -> ZrCl4 -> Hf solvent-extraction -> Kroll reduction. <10 plants worldwide; Russian/Chinese share of nuclear-grade refining = FEOC chokepoint. |
| Nickel RefiningNorilsk Nickel refineries (Russia) | Russia | Covered nation | Class-1 nickel refined in Russia. China also dominates global nickel-sulphate midstream; here Russian-refined = flagged. |
| Molybdenum Roasting/RefiningChina roasters | China | Covered nation | MoS2 roasted to MoO3/ferromolybdenum; China dominates midstream refining = FEOC chokepoint. |
| Cobalt RefiningChina cobalt refineries | China | Covered nation | China refines ~70-80% of global cobalt = clear FEOC midstream chokepoint. |
| Titanium Sponge RefiningVSMPO-AVISMA, Berezniki | Russia | Covered nation | Kroll-process Ti sponge in Russia. China also dominates global Ti sponge; Russian-refined = flagged. |
| Boron Carbide ProductionChina B4C plants | China | Covered nation | Borate -> boric acid -> B4C; China dominant midstream producer = FEOC chokepoint. |
| Rare Earth Separation/RefiningChina REE separation plants | China | Covered nation | China controls ~85-90% of rare-earth separation; the definitive FEOC midstream chokepoint even for allied-mined REE. |
| Input | Origin | Sourcing risk | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enriched Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6)TVEL enrichment plants | Russia | Covered nation | Product of centrifuge enrichment; feedstock for UO2 pellet fabrication. |
| Natural UF6 (converted)SCC Seversk / AECC Angarsk conversion | Russia | Covered nation | U3O8 converted via UF4 + fluorine to UF6 for enrichment feed. |
| Fluorine / Hydrofluoric Acid (conversion reagent)Russia (fluorspar-derived HF) | Russia | Covered nation | Fluorine gas for UF4->UF6 conversion; China dominates global fluorspar/HF supply though Russian conversion uses domestic reagent. |
| Uranium Ore Concentrate (U3O8 / yellowcake)Uranium One JVs | Kazakhstan | Elevated sourcing risk | Mixed sourcing: Russian domestic + Kazakh/Uzbek JVs. Rosatom sold ~50% of Zarechnoye JV to Chinese firm (Dec 2024), raising China exposure. |
| Nuclear-Grade Zirconium SpongeChepetsky Mechanical Plant (ChMZ), Glazov | Russia | Covered nation | Hf-free Zr sponge via Kroll process. ChMZ also exports Zr sponge to China (CAEIC contract). Russian-controlled. |
| Zircon Sand (ZrSiO4)Heavy mineral sands | Australia | Elevated sourcing risk | Australia + South Africa hold ~72% of zircon reserves; feedstock for Zr sponge. Allied-mined but midstream cracking often outside supplier control. |
| Hafnium (separation co-product)ChMZ Glazov | Russia | Covered nation | Hf separated from Zr; itself used as control-rod absorber. Capital-intensive separation concentrated in few plants. |
| Niobium (Zr-Nb alloy additive)Nb feed for E110/E635 alloy | Brazil | Elevated sourcing risk | Zr-1%Nb cladding alloy needs niobium. Brazil (CBMM) dominates global Nb; allied-mined but alloying done in Russia. |
| Mn-Ni-Mo Low-Alloy Reactor Steel ForgingsAEM-Technology / Atommash forge shops | Russia | Covered nation | SA-533B-class forgings: ~1.15-1.5% Mn, 0.4-0.7% Ni, 0.45-0.6% Mo. Russian-forged. |
| Nickel (alloy input)Norilsk Nickel | Russia | Covered nation | Reactor/pump alloy nickel from Norilsk Nickel; Russian-mined and refined. |
| Molybdenum (alloy input)Mo ferroalloy feed | China | Covered nation | Mo for reactor-steel and superalloys; China leads global Mo mining + roasting/refining. |
| Maraging Steel / Carbon-Fibre Rotor MaterialRussia (centrifuge rotor production) | Russia | Covered nation | Ultra-high-strength maraging steel and carbon-fibre composite rotors withstand 500-720 m/s tip speed. Russian-produced. |
| Cobalt (maraging steel input)Co feed for maraging alloy | Democratic Republic Of Congo | Elevated sourcing risk | 18Ni maraging grades use ~8-12% cobalt. DRC-mined but China refines ~70-80% of world cobalt. |
| Titanium (condenser tubing)VSMPO-AVISMA | Russia | Covered nation | Power Machines titanium-tube condensers; VSMPO-AVISMA is Russian titanium sponge/mill giant. |
| Boron Carbide (B4C absorber)B4C for control rods | China | Covered nation | Boron carbide neutron absorber; China dominates boron mineral and B4C production. |
| Gadolinium Oxide (burnable poison)Gd2O3 for fuel pellets / absorbers | China | Covered nation | Gd (49,000 barn cross-section) + Sm/Eu/Dy rare-earth absorbers; China dominates rare-earth separation. |
| Input | Origin | Sourcing risk | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kazakh Uranium Mines (ISR)Akbastau, Karatau, Akdala, South Inkai, Kharasan, Zarechnoye | Kazakhstan | Elevated sourcing risk | In-situ recovery mines via Uranium One JVs. Chinese stakes growing (Zarechnoye ~50% sold to China 2024). |
| Russian Uranium MinesARMZ / Priargunsky (Krasnokamensk), Khiagda, Dalur | Russia | Covered nation | Rosatom mining division ARMZ; all Russian uranium producers are Rosatom-owned. FEOC by nationality. |
| Uzbek Uranium Mine (Aktau)Aktau site, Uzbekistan | Uzbekistan | Elevated sourcing risk | Rosatom-operated, ~500 t expected. Allied-neutral geography under Russian operatorship. |
| Heavy Mineral Sands Mines (zircon)Australia / South Africa HMS operations | Australia | No known risk factor | Allied-mined zircon-bearing heavy mineral sands. |
| Niobium Mine (pyrochlore)Araxá, Brazil (CBMM) | Brazil | No known risk factor | ~85% of world niobium from Brazil. Allied-friendly source. |
| Nickel MineNorilsk / Kola Peninsula | Russia | Covered nation | Norilsk Nickel sulphide deposits. Russian FEOC by nationality. |
| Molybdenum MineChina (also Russia domestic sources) | China | Covered nation | China largest Mo producer; molybdenite ore. |
| Cobalt MineKatanga copper-cobalt belt, DRC | Democratic Republic Of Congo | Elevated sourcing risk | DRC supplies ~70% of mined cobalt; mixed ownership incl. Chinese operators. |
| Titanium Feedstock Mine (ilmenite/rutile)ilmenite/rutile HMS (historically Ukraine/Kazakhstan feed) | Ukraine | Elevated sourcing risk | VSMPO-AVISMA historically fed by Ukrainian/Kazakh ilmenite; sanctions have shifted sourcing. |
| Borate MineTurkey (Eti Maden) / USA borate deposits | Turkey | Elevated sourcing risk | Turkey + USA hold most borate reserves; allied-neutral mining. |
| Rare Earth MineBayan Obo, China (+ some allied deposits) | China | Covered nation | Heavy/medium REE for Gd/Sm/Eu/Dy absorbers; China holds dominant mine share. |
Research-based supply-chain map compiled from public sources - not an audited bill of materials. Tiers reflect the standard industry structure for this product. Sourcing risk on a node describes where that input is typically mined or refined; it is not a FEOC determination for Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation, and it is not a screening result for the node itself unless a federal listing is cited against it. Verify against primary documentation before making a compliance determination.
Primary sources (1) - government, filings, standards bodies
Secondary sources (26) - trade press, analysts, reference works